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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW ON 
MONOPOLY: THE IMPACT OF THE IBM 
WEST COAST CASES 
Robert L. Knox* 
Chroniclers of the development of public policy toward mo-
nopoly may someday regard the 1970's as an important water-
shed in that development. The main events of that decade re-
volved around a series of court decisions involving International 
Business Machines Corporation (IBM). The issues dealt with 
IBM's response to burgeoning competition from manufacturers 
who produced peripheral devices that could be attached to IBM 
systems, thus replacing the corresponding IBM product. After 
years of litigation, IBM has been acquitted of monopoly charges. 
This article explores the reasons for that acquittal and discusses 
the implications for competitive behavior in general. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An exhaustive analysis of monopolization litigation divides 
the process into three historical stages. l Stage I ended with the 
U.S. Steel case of 1920 and was characterized as the "abuse the-
ory" of monopolization.2 Firms would be found guilty of violat-
ing Section 2 of the Sherman Act3 if the record revealed a pat-
tern of overt predatory acts specifically designed to enhance 
market position at the expense of identifiable competitors, ac-
tual or potential.· 
Stage II began in the late 1930's and ended in the 1950's, 
with the centerpieces being the Alcoa decision of 1945 supported 
• Professor of Economics, Arizona State University; Ph.D., Economics, University of 
North Carolina, 1963; M.S. Economics, Oklahoma State University, 1958; B.S. Econom-
ics, Oklahoma State University, 1954. 
1. Flynn, Monopolization Under the Sherman Act: The Third Wave and Beyond, 
26 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 1 (1981), [hereinafter cited as Flynn]. 
2. U.S. v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). 
3. 15 U.S.C.A. Paragraphs 1-7 (1980). 
4. Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
309 
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in 1953 by United Shoe.r; The major premise of this stage was a 
determination that a firm with a large share of a market could 
be guilty of monopolizing if its conduct were judged to be exclu-
sionary in the sense that actual competitors could not grow or 
potential competitors were intimidated and hence would not 
enter the market.6 Such conduct enabled a firm to acquire or 
maintain monopoly power even though the conduct itself was 
not abusive or predatory.7 Emphasis was on the structure of the 
market and the resulting behavior that enabled the firm to 
maintain its market position.8 Stage II recognized that a firm's 
market position might be the result of natural market forces or 
might evolve from "superior skill and foresight," but the pivotal 
cases gave little guidance as to what conduct met these criteria.9 
Efforts by alleged monopolists to employ the "thrust upon" or 
"superior skill and foresight" defenses were unsuccessfu1.10 At 
the close of this stage, the legal test for monopolization was de-
finitively summarized in U.S. v. Grinnell Corp.:ll 
The offense of monopoly under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession 
of monopoly power in the relevant market, and 
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or develop-
ment as a consequence of a superior product, bus-
iness acumen, or historic accident . . . .12 
This test requires a two-stage inquiry. First, the degree of 
monopoly power must be determined in an appropriately de-
fined market. The intensity of the competitive pressures, if any, 
felt by the alleged monopolist must be reduced to an economi-
cally defensible number - the market share of the defendant.13 
Once this threshold has been surmounted, attention shifts to the 
5. u.s. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945); U.S. v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (1953), aff'd 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
6. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 429-45. 
7. See P. ASCH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTiTRUST DILEMMA at 255 (1970). 
8. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 342. 
9. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 430. 
10. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 343. 
11. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
12. [d. at 570-71. 
13. Problems of market definition and market share determination are thoroughly 
discuased in F. FISHER, J. MCGOWAN and J. GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTI-
LATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM at 43-49 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FISHER). 
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conduct of the alleged monopolist. Was the monopoly power 
achieved, maintained, or strengthened by business practices 
which are unjustifiable and which unnecessarily exclude rivals 
by damaging the competitive process? Distinguishing between 
such practices and those resulting from a superior product or 
business acumen become the essential issue of a monopolization 
case. If 
Stage III began in the late 1960's with the Section 2 cases 
filed against International Business Machines Corporation by 
Control Data Corporation1& and the Department of Justice.1s 
This stage has developed largely through private litigation, al-
though some key government cases have provided important im-
petus. Its focal point is the effort by private litigants to chal-
lenge IBM's leading position in the electronic data processing 
industry and the parallel effort by the Department of Justice to 
dissolve IBM.17 In addition, a private case against Eastman Ko-
dak and government cases against DuPont, oil companies, and 
the cereal companies attempted to break new ground in the legal 
approach to monopoly.18 
Stage III furthered the use of economic analysis in monop-
oly cases to analyze the behavior of the alleged monopolist in an 
effort to define what type of conduct could be construed as ex-
clusionary and hence anticompetitive, and what type of conduct 
represented a reasonable response by a large firm to competition 
from rivals. 19 The alleged monopolists were all large in an abso-
lute sense and occupied leading positions in their respective 
markets. In most cases the firms were generally regarded as pro-
gressive in technology and well-managed.20 
If Stage III is ultimately judged to signal a new era in the 
development of public policy toward monopoly, it will largely be 
14. [d. at 24·41. 
15. Control Date Corporation v. International Business Machines Corp., 318 F. 
Supp. 145 (1970). 
16. U.S. v. International Business Machines Corp., No. 69-200 (S.D. N.Y.) (1969). 
17. [d. 
18. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); In the 
Matter of E.J. DuPont De Nemours & Company, FTC Docket No. 9108; In re Exxon 
Corp., et al., FTC Docket No. 8934; In re Kellog Co., et al., FTC Docket No. 8883. 
19. Flynn, supra note 1 at 34-36, 118. 
20. For a discussion of important Stage III cases, see Flynn, supra note 1 at 22-29. 
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because of a series of Section 2 cases and court decisions involv-
ing IBM. The recent withdrawal of its massive case by the De-
partment of Justice signals a close of the IBM litigation and af-
fords an opportunity to assess the results of several private cases 
which essentially involved the same issues and which therefore 
suggest the direction Stage III is taking. All the cases began and 
most were concluded in the 1970'S.21 The plaintiffs were compet-
itors of IBM in the electronic data processing industry, a field 
that has experienced the most rapid growth and changing tech-
nology of any in the American economy in this century. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The history of the IBM litigation dates from the previously 
identified Control Data and Department of Justice suits. How-
ever, the former was settled prior to trial and the latter was 
eventually withdrawn. Consequently, the new developments in 
the application of Section 2 are based on cases involving compa-
nies that manufacture or lease electronic data processing equip-
ment used primarily with and competing against IBM products. 
Plaintiffs in the cases were: Telex Corporation, California 
Computer Products (CalComp), Memorex Corporation, Grey-
hound Computer Leasing Corporation and Transamerica Leas-
ing Corporation. The first three were manufacturers of electronic 
data processing equipment and the last two were leasing compa-
nies.22 Telex resulted in a verdict against IBM at the trial level, 
but was reversed by an appeals court and settled before Su-
preme Court review. CalComp resulted in a directed verdict for 
IBM at the close of the plaintiff's case, later affirmed at the ap-
21. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9 Cir. 1977); California Com-
puter Products, Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as CalComp]; 
Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. 
IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Memorex]; Transamerica 
Computer Co. v. IBM, 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Transamerica]. 
22. A leasing company purchases equipment from a manufacturer and markets that 
equipment to end users through various types of lease arrangements. It is not uncommon 
for a leasing company to displace a company's product on lease with an identical substi-
tute purchased from the same company. For example, a leasing company might purchase 
a System/370 central processor from IBM and lease it to a bank which already had a 
similar or identical machine. For this to occur, the leasing company would have to offer 
better terms than IBM. 
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peals level, and no petition for certiorari was filed. Memorex was 
fully litigated and resulted in a directed verdict for IBM; the 
judgment was later affirmed by the appeals court,23 and the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari. 24 Greyhound yielded a directed 
verdict for IBM at the close of the plaintiff's case, was later re-
versed and remanded by an appeals court, but was settled before 
the second trial began. Transamerica was fully litigated26 and 
the trial judge entered a directed verdict for IBM; the decision 
was affirmed on appeal.26 Juries were involved in both Memorex 
and Transamerica, but were unable to render a decision. Nu-
merous federal judges have analyzed the issues and arguments 
and generally the results have been the same. IBM has been ac-
quitted of charges that it monopolized the electronic data 
processing industry. 
III. ISSUES 
IBM was one of the pioneers in the development of elec-
tronic data processing. Although it was not the first firm to build 
a computer, it was the first to commit itself fully to the fledgling 
industry in the 1950's. IBM started from an established base in 
the office tabulating field, where it was a leader, and quickly rose 
to prominence along with several other firms in the development 
of electronic data processing (EDP) systems. It was in the fore-
front of new technological developments in a relatively short pe-
riod of time - approximately twenty-five years. IBM did not 
develop all of the innovations, but it had its share and was quick 
to capitalize on developments by others, both inside and outside 
the industry. Its preeminence was 'hardly disputable, and, in 
1964, it brought out the 360 line of electronic data processing 
systems.27 The development represented an important commit-
ment to developing a full line of compatible hardware, ranging 
from a relatively small to a very large and powerful system that 
was fully compatible with support hardware and software. How-
ever, it laid the foundation for the subsequent monopoly litiga-
23. Memorex Corp., etc., et aI. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). 
24. 69 L. Ed. 2d 983 (1981). 
25. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. 965. 
26. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983). 
27. For a discussion of the development of the computer industry and particularly 
the development of the IBM System/360, see FISHER, supra note 13, at 5-11. See also, A. 
McADAMS, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1982). 
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tion of the 1970's .. 
This litigation can be identified conveniently as the IBM 
West Coast cases, since most of the major plaintiffs were head-
quartered in California and the court trials and subsequent ap-
peals were all in the Ninth Circuit. The Telex case was the pri-
mary antecedent, and the verdict against IBM at the trial level 
in the case spawned and encouraged CalComp, Memorex and 
Transamerica. 28 
To understand the issues in the West Coast cases it is im-
portant to visualize an electronic data processing system. Such a 
system consists of several devices known as hardware, most no-
table of which is the central processing unit (CPU). This device 
performs the calculations involved in a computer process after 
receiving information from other devices known as peripherals. 
The CPU produces output that flows to and from other per-
ipherals. The entire process is controlled by software, which tells 
the CPU and attending peripherals what to do. Systems manu-
facturers, such as IBM, produce and market all of the hardware 
and software required to transform the raw information into us-
able output. Other companies concentrate on producing and 
marketing one or more of the peripheral devices, such as a disk 
file, a terminal or a printer. Still others serve as intermediaries, 
purchasing hardware from systems manufacturers and periph-
eral companies and remarketing these devices to end users 
through leasing arrangements. Of the major plaintiffs in the 
West Coast cases, CalComp and Memorex were manufacturers 
of peripheral devices and Transamerica was a leasing company 
that purchased these products from other manufacturers such as 
Telex. 
Companies such as CalComp and Memorex were known as 
plug-compatible manufacturers (PCMs). These companies pro-
duced peripheral devices that could be attached to IBM systems, 
thereby replacing the corresponding IBM product. For example, 
Memorex would obtain an IBM tape drive or disk drive reverse-
engineer the device, and offer it to users of IBM equipment as a 
substitute for an existing IBM tape or disk drive. During the 
reverse-engineering process, PCMs sometimes improved the 
28. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973). 
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product so it had considerable appeal to users, who could re-
place an existing IBM device with a PCM device that would ei-
ther be the equivalent of or an improvement on the IBM prod-
uct. Since the PCMs had little or no development costs, and 
since they were duplicating only successful IBM products, they 
could offer the peripheral at a lower price than IBM's compati-
ble product. The lower price was also necessary to compete 
against IBM's established reputation for quality products and 
services. Users of IBM equipment had to be convinced of better 
price and/or performance in the PCM devices to be induced to 
make the substitution. Within the electronic data processing in-
dustry, therefore, a group of companies developed that staked 
their success on duplicating IBM peripheral devices and offering 
them to users at lower prices. The success of this business strat-
egy is evidenced by the fact that in the early 1970's, PCMs were 
growing rapidly and replacing IBM equipment at an accelerating 
rate. lIe 
However, this strategy was risky. Essentially it was based on 
two premises: First, the PCMs could copy the most successful 
IBM devices rapidly enough to produce sufficient profit to with-
stand obsolescence of their equipment through new and/or im-
29. 
PCM Placements and Revenues 
Disks . Tapes 
Year SEindles ($ Million) (Drives) ($ Million) 
1968 150 23.7 850 4.3 
1969 1,050 SO.8 2,950 29.9 
1970 4,833 110.6 4,169 135.4 
1971 12,402 162.6 5,931 312.3 
1972 14,898 183.9 6,962 378.6 
1973 22,600 307.8 12,272 689.8 
1974 22,600 307.8 12,272 689.8 
1975 26,585 352.5 13,607 854.3 
Defendant's Exhibit 6515, p. 34, as cited in Brief of Appellee, Transamerica v. IBM, 699 
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983) at 16 [hereinafter cited as mM's Transamerica Appeals Brief]. 
Evidence offered in Transamerica showed that PCM list prices for virtually identi-
cal products were fifteen to twenty percent below mM prices and often included dis-
counts off list and other inducements such as free maintenance. In early 1971, IBM's 
monthly sales of peripherals were only nineteen percent of its projection. During the first 
five months of 1971, PCM's net installations of 2314 disk-type spindles rose from 2,000 
to 6,500. mM projected that it would lose ninety percent of its leased 2314/2319 disk 
installations by the end of 1973. mM's Transamerica Appeals Brief, supra at 13-14. 
7
Knox: Competition in Computers
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
316 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:309 
proved technology; and second, IBM would not counter this rap-
idly emerging competition through product innovations and/or 
price reductions.30 Rather, it was an implicit strategic assump-
tion that IBM would continue to provide a price umbrella over 
the PCMs that would enable them to flourish by replicating 
IBM products and offering them at lower prices. The soundness 
of this strategy and the ultimate results constituted the major 
issue in the West Coast cases.31 
As the PCMs grew and prospered, IBM found itself losing 
peripheral business. Users of IBM equipment on thirty-day lease 
were replacing that equipment and IBM became alarmed at the 
quantity of its peripherals coming off lease. Since peripherals ac-
count for somewhere between fifty and seventy-five percent of 
the value of a system, IBM viewed the PCMs as an important 
competitive threat, so important that it designated peripheral 
competition as a Key Corporate Strategic Issue and established 
a high-level executive group to study not only the threat but also 
some of the companies that individually posed that threat.32 The 
group, known within IBM as the Peripherals Task Force, had 
the responsibility of making recommendations as to how IBM 
could counter the growing competition.33 
Monopoly cases have both structural and behavioral dimen-
sions. The structure centers on the determination of a relevant 
market while the behavior focuses on the conduct of the alleged 
monopolist. In many cases market definition is crucial because it 
is a hurdle the plaintiff must surmount before proceeding to the 
conduct issues.34 Market definition in the West Coast cases was 
complex, largely because of the rapid growth and changing tech-
nology that characterize electronic data processing. However, it 
became a secondary issue because the trial and appellate courts 
simply assumed that IBM had monopoly power and proceeded 
to analyze its behavior.35 Thus the West Coast cases centered on 
30. CalComp, 613 F.2d at 738-40. 
31. IBM's Post-Trial Brief, Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., Northern 
District of California, Civil Action No. C-73-1832-RHS, at 4-6 [hereinafter cited as 
IBM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief]. 
32. Appellants' Opening Brief, Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th 
Cir. 1980), at 33. 
33. [d. at 34-37. 
34. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 974-76. 
35. CaiComp, 613 F.2d at 738. 
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conduct. Since even a monopolist can compete, the question be-
came: When a firm has monopoly power in some relevant mar-
ket, what sort of conduct can it pursue in response to competi-
tive pressures that is not unreasonably restrictive of competi-
tion?38 
IBM's response to the competitive pressures generated by 
the PCMs can usefully be analyzed under three categories: (1) 
price, (2) marketing, and (3) product or technology. The strate-
gies did not exist in isolation; they were interrelated and to some 
extent sequential. However, understanding is facilitated by look-
ing at each strategy in turn. It must be remembered that price/ 
performance is the key to competition in the electronic data 
processing industry.37 
A. Pricing 
As already indicated above, PCM peripheral prices were 
considerably below those of the IBM equivalents. The principal 
IBM product that had been replicated by the PCMs was the 
2314 disk drive. A disk drive is a device that stores data for 
processing on vertically stacked disks resembling phonograph 
records. Heads, which are mounted on arms, fly over the disks 
and electronically read the data already recorded, or, alterna-
tively, record new data onto the disk. The stacks of disks are 
called spindles, and a disk drive may contain one or more spin-
dles. The 2314, which was IBM's most popular drive, came in 
one-, two-, and four-spindle models. 
The disk drive is attached to the CPU through a stand-
alone device called. a controller. The controller serves as an in-
termediary between the drive and the processor, regulating the 
input and output of data. The drive and the control unit were 
marketed together as a subsystem of both IBM and PCMs. 
IBM had been developing a process known as "native at-
tachment."38 This process would eliminate the stand-alone con-
trol unit and allow the disk drive to attach directly to the CPU, 
36. [d. at 735-36. 
37. FISHER, supra note 13, at 131. 
38. Appellee's Brief, supra note 32, at 48-50. 
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thereby saving costs and improving performance. This process 
was known as "Apricot," and the interface for native attachment 
was the same as the one between IBM's disk drives and their 
control units. The interface between the control unit and the 
CPU had been copied by the PCMs which enabled their subsys-
tem (drive plus control unit) to attach to the IBM CPU. How-
ever, since the PCMs were interested only in attaching to the 
CPU, they had not copied the interface between IBM's disk 
drive and control unit.89 
This did not present a problem for the PCMs, however, be-
cause the Apricot interface was known in the marketplace and 
could have been duplicated by the PCMs had it been chosen by 
IBM for the native attachment.4o Instead, IBM developed a new 
interface, designated "Mallard," which would be used with its 
new disk drive, the 2319AY This drive was a remanufactured 
four-spindle 2314 with one spindle removed in order to house 
the electronics which permitted native attachment through the 
Mallard interface.42 
The 2319A was IBM's initial response to the competitive in-
roads of the PCMs. This disk drive attached natively to two of 
the most popular models of the 370 CPU through the Mallard 
interface. Since the 2319A was a reuse of the displaced 2314 
drive without a controller, it could be priced. below it. The price 
chosen was $1,000 per month rental for the three-spindle drive.48 
This price narrowed considerably the differential between IBM 
and its PCM competitors. Moreover, the PCMs could not attach 
their substitutes to the 370 CPU without reengineering the in-
terface. They charged IBM with predatory behavior designed to 
halt the growing PCM displacement of the IBM disk drives.44 
Prices were alleged to be predatory, since PCMs were forced to 
reduce the prices of their 2314 substitutes, and the product was 
39. IBM's Transamerica Appeals Brief, supra note 29, at 82. 
40. [d. at 83. 
41. [d. at 84. 
42. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1004-5. 
43. The lower price for the 2319A stemmed from the reuse program. The marginal 
cost of converting a displaced 2314 to a 2319A was considerably below the cost of devel-
oping an entirely new drive. Hence, the price could be lower and, even if the perform-
. ance was constant, users still would find the 2319A attractive because of a better price/ 
performance ratio. 
44. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1004-5. 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/4
1984] . COMPETITION IN COMPUTERS 319 
said to be predatory because the new interface precluded them 
from attaching their drives. 
1. Was IBM's Pricing Predatory? 
Since the turn-of-the-century monopoly cases of Standard 
Oil4& and American Tobacco;'6 predatory pricing has been recog-
nized as an abuse of monopoly power. A firm might sell a prod-
uct below its costs, deliberately incurring short-term losses, until 
rivals are sufficiently disciplined or driven from the marketplace. 
Then the predator can raise the price to the monopoly level, 
thereby ensuring above-normal profits. Economists, however, 
have questioned the rationality of this behavior. The predator 
would need a "deep pocket" to sustain the losses until rivals are 
eliminated.·' Moreover, once the pricejs raised to the monopoly 
level, new firms will enter the market or older ones will reappear 
and the predator must repeat the process. It might be cheaper 
simply to buyout the rivals one is trying to eliminate. 
Concern over the prevalence of predatory pricing and a 
method of determining when it exists led to the famous 
"Areeda-Turner" rule.·s Professors Areeda and Turner, using 
conventional microeconomic analysis, argued that a cost-based 
test should be used.·9 Prices are predatory if they are below 
marginal cost, or as an alternative, average variable cost. These 
costs belong to the predator, not the rival. Prices below the ri-
val's marginal or average variable costs but above the alleged 
predator's are not predatory but merely serve to impact or elimi-
nate a less efficient rival. GO Presumably, this provides an objec-
tive standard that permits decision-makers to predict the legal 
45. Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1. 
46. U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
47. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 JOURNAL OF 
LAw AND ECONOMICS 137 (1958). See also Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing, 4 ANTI-
TRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 105 (1971). 
48. Areeda and Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1975). 
49. The literature on predatory pricing is voluminous. For a good summary see HAY, 
A CONFUSED LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE PREDATORY PRICING LITERATURE, STRATEGY, PREDA-
TION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, (Federal Trade Commission) (1981) and the numerous 
citations therein. 
50. Areeda and Turner, supra note 48, at 709. 
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consequences of their acts. III 
In the West Coast cases, plaintiffs argued that IBM's pric-
ing of the 2319A was predatory, designed to inflict maximum 
damage on the PCMs.1I2 This price, according to the PCMs, was 
chosen after careful study of their costs and prices and was set 
low enough to ensure that if they responded with even lower 
prices, their profits would be seriously impaired.1I3 
In cases in the Ninth Circuit, the Areeda-Turner rule had 
been used as a test for predatory pricing.1I4 Consequently, the 
PCMs had to show that IBM's prices were below its marginal or 
average variable costs. In neither CalComp nor Memorex did the 
plaintiff offer evidence to support this claim. Transamerica at-
tempted to show predatory pricing by an after-the-fact analysis 
of IBM's internal pricing procedures.1I1I Like most firms, IBM 
had a formalized procedure for arriving at announcement prices 
for new products. This procedure relied on expected demand, 
product life, direct manufacturing costs, and an allocation of in-
direct costs based on some standard, in this case revenue appor-
tionment. lle Based on this procedure, IBM argued that the an-
nouncement price chosen for the 2319A was above its costs and 
therefore expected to be profitable. II? Since IBM followed its 
usual pricing procedure and the PCMs did not offer evidence 
showing prices below IBM's cost, the courts rejected the preda-
tory pricing allegation. liS In addition, in Memorex a meeting-
competition rule was promulgated (MC/AVC). Even a firm with 
monopoly power is permitted to respond to competition by re-
ducing prices absent any showing that the prices were below 
51. Id. at 698. 
52. In addition, since the PCMs argued that the 2319A and the 2314 disk file were 
the same product, they alleged that the lower price on the 2319A was also discrimina-
tory. The weakness of this argument is discussed in FISHER, supra note 13, at 316-17. 
53. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 32, at 46. 
54. Hansen y. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976); Janich Bros., Inc. v. 
American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 
467 F. Supp. 841 (1979) aff'd 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981). 
55. Transamerica's Opening Post-Trial Brief, 481 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1979) at 
109-112. 
56. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 997-98. 
57. IBM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief, 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) at 34-
45. 
58. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 431. 
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marginal or average variable costs. liB In the course of developing 
this cost-based rule of meeting competition, several variations 
emerged. 
In CalComp, for example, the court indicated a somewhat 
stronger standard than the MCI A VC rule. It noted that prices 
might be predatory if they were above MCI A VC but below the 
short-run profit maximizing price provided entry barriers· were 
high.60 This standard is analogous to the economic concept of 
"limit pricing," where a firm sets a price to deter the entry of 
new firms or the expansion of existing firms. Presumably this 
price is above its own costs, but below those of a potential en-
trant or a less efficient rival. 
However, the Memorex court rejected this possibility, not-
ing that the record did not support the conjecture that IBM was 
pursuing a limit price strategy, primarily because of the absence 
of significant entry barriers.61 Indeed, the record of rapid entry 
of new firms into all areas of electronic data processing was 
overwhelming. 
The Transamerica court promulgated a more rigorous cost 
test than the Areeda-Turner rule. It required that prices equal 
or exceed average total costs.6l1 The plaintiff, Transamerica, at-
tempted to show that IBM's pricing procedure would always 
produce prices that exceed average total cost and, moreover, 
that costs were improperly determined. The court rejected these 
after-the-fact adjustments, citing mM's use of its normal pricing 
procedure. 
In summary, on the pricing issue, the CalComp, Memorex, 
and Transamerica courts were unanimous in rejecting plaintiffs' 
claims of predatory pricing. IBM's evidence that prices set at 
announcement, based on a standard pricing procedure, were e~­
pected to produce substantial profits and follow-up studies 
showing actual profitability sufficiently rebutted the predatory 
pricing allegation. 
59. [d. 
so. CalComp, S13 F.2d at 742-43. 
Sl. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 433. 
S2. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 995. 
13
Knox: Competition in Computers
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
322 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:309 
B. Technology 
The plaintiffs in the West Coast cases attacked the 2319A 
(and its counterpart, the 2319B) as a product manipulation, the 
sole purpose of which was to preclude the PCMs from attaching 
their IBM copies to the 370 and 360 CPUs. They argued that 
IBM had no new technology available to combat the competition 
of the PCMs and therefore attempted to buy some time by de-
veloping a product that did not have improved technology but 
simply made life more difficult for their rivals. Moreover, they 
argued that IBM switched from the planned use of the interface 
Apricot, whose electronics were known, to Mallard, whose elec-
tronics were not, simply to preclude further PCM penetration of 
the peripheral market. 
IBM's response to these allegations centered, as might be 
expected, on the technical improvements in the disk drives and 
their overall enhancement of the IBM systems. In a rapidly 
changing technological environment, it is inevitable that engi-
neers will differ as to the appropriate design change. Even 
within IBM disagreement occurred, a fact strongly emphasized 
by the plaintiffs. The abandonment of one approach to attaching 
disk drives (Apricot) for another (Mallard) was cited by the 
plaintiffs as evidence that IBM chose the design most disadvan-
tageous to the PCMs. This design, however, could be construed 
as most advantageous to IBM from an overall competitive view-
point, given the fact that peripherals account for such an impor-
tant part of an electronic data processing system. 
The issue of choice among alternative strategies, in this in-
stance involving the interface, was an important element in de-
termining the extent to which a monopolist can respond to grow-
ing competition that is eroding its market position. In the 
dispute over the choice of Mallard over Apricot, plaintiffs in the 
West Coast cases argued that, since the Apricot interface could 
be more easily replicated, it should have been chosen. It repre-
sented a "softer alternative," a choice that would generate 
weaker competitive pressures. The CalComp court dealt with 
this issue forthrightly when it observed: 
IBM, assuming it was a monopolist, had the right 
to redesign its products to make them more at-
tractive to buyers - whether by reason of lower 
14
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manufacturing cost and price or improved per-
formance. It was under no duty to help CalComp 
or other peripheral equipment manufacturers sur-
vive or expand. IBM need not have provided its 
rivals with disk products to examine and copy nor 
have constricted its product development so as to 
facilitate sales of rival products.68 
323 
Specifically, IBM argued that the native attachment aspect 
of the 2319A offered cost savings in general, and putting part of 
the disk control electronics in the drive simplified maintenance, 
freed space in the central processor for other features and al-
lowed for growth and possible future design modifications.6ol Ei-
ther of the proposals for native attachment would have required 
an interface modification by the PCMs to permit their substi-
tute 2314 drives to attach to the 370 intermediate systems. 
PCMs argued that it would have been easier to modify their 
products to attach under the Apricot program than under the 
Mallard program, both from a cost and time standpoint.6C1 How-
ever, IBM produced evidence that showed that the modification 
of the 2319A was relatively easy, requiring approximately thirty 
days of engineering effort.66 
The nub of the dispute over design changes was both engi-
neering and economic. In the latter case, the question was sim-
ply whether it would be more profitable for the PCMs to devote 
resources to reengineering their products to cope with the inter-
face changes of 2319A or continue to produce their 2314 disk 
and controller subsystem that could still attach to all of the 370 
systems as previously. With the price advantage the PCMs en-
joyed over IBM's compatible 2314 drives, fulfilling replacement 
orders, of which a backlog existed, seemed more profitable.67 
Thus, the court in Memorex68 refused to become enmeshed 
in an engineering dispute as to which design, Apricot or Mallard, 
was preferable, and which design would have the least competi-
63. CalComp, 613 F.2d at 744. 
64. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1004-05. 
65. [d. 
66. mM's Transamerica Appeals Brief, supra note 29, at 83. 
67. [d. 
68. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 439. 
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tive impact on the PCMs. It resolved the issue in favor of IBM 
on the grounds that the changes were based on sound engineer-
ing judgment and represented a competitive response by IBM to 
growing competition in disk drives and complete systems.69 
1. Other Design Changes70 
IBM's response to competition of PCMs in the area of disk 
products was also adopted in tape drives. Older products were 
superceded by technologically improved products which were 
sold or leased at lower prices. PCM plaintiffs attacked this strat-
egy as simply "old wine in new bottles," the purpose of which 
was to destroy PCM competition through a disguised price cut.71 
Specifically, IBM announced a tape subsystem consisting of a 
new control unit (the 3803) and a new drive (the 3420). The en-
tire project was code-named "Aspen."72 PCM plaintiffs did not 
dispute the technical superiority of the control unit but argued 
that the tape drive was simply a refurbished drive of older tech-
nology which required a new interface between the drive and the 
controller and thus precluded the PCMs from attaching their 
tape drives of the older.technology to the new controller.73 IBM 
argued that, because the new controller was a superior product, 
it required a new interface to work with the tape drive, and . 
therefore a new tape drive was necessary.7. As to pricing, the 
Aspen system was profitable. Moreover, PCMs were not pre-
cluded from attaching their new tape drives, and one PCM 
(Telex) announced an Aspen copy in short order. The trial court 
in Transamerica found Aspen to be a product improvement of-
fered at a lower price and consequently a reasonable response to 
competition, noting that the antitrust laws do not protect com-
petitors from product competition.7G 
Another reuse program for tape drives (Mandan) involved 
similar issues. Older model tape drives had been returned to 
69. [d. at 440. 
70. Other design changes and their impact are discussed in Transamerica, 481 F. 
Supp. at 1003-8. 
n. [d. at 1004·05. 
72. [d. at 1005. 
73. [d. 
74. IBM's Transamerica Appeals Brief, supra note 29, at 94. 
75. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1004. 
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IBM from lease. Rather than incur the expense of storage or 
scrapping, IBM reused the older drives by changing seven wires 
and offered the new drive to customers who preferred a lower-
cost alternative to Aspen.76 The Transamerica trial court found 
that the interface change did not preclude PCMs from attaching 
their drives to the control unit had they wished to make the dis-
closed changes in the older technology drives.77 Therefore, Man-
dan was a project which produced a tape drive of at least equal 
if not superior quality at a lower price. 
The final product design change alleged by the PCMs to 
have been undertaken by IBM to destroy competition involved 
new central processors. In 1972 and 1973 IBM announced two 
new models in the 370 family of computers. These models were 
the smallest in the product line.78 The PCMs argued that the 
products were deliberately degraded by IBM to prevent attach-
ment of PCM peripherals.79 This was accomplished, according to 
the PCMs, by failing to include an optional selector channel and 
also by supplying a slower byte multiplexor channel than had 
been previously planned.80 These designs were alleged to have 
prevented the PCMs from attaching older technology tape and 
disk drives to the new 370 processors. The Transamerica trial 
court determined that IBM had indeed investigated removing 
the selector channel primarily to preclude PCM attachment but, 
in the course of the investigation, found the selector channel to 
be unnecessary from the standpoint of attaching the IBM tape 
and disk drives designed for the new CPUS.81 By eliminating it, 
IBM saved time and development expense. The tape and disk 
drives designed to work with the new processors were natively 
attached and offered better performance at lower prices than the 
older PCM (and IBM) technology. The Memorex trial court, in 
addressing this issue, stated: "[T]he DDA (the native attach-
ment electronics on the 115 and 125s) was a product innovation, 
and that IBM was not required to provide a channel on the 125 
and 115 to facilitate attachment of Memorex products."82 The 
76. [d. at 1003-04. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. at 1006. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 1007-08. 
81. [d. 
82. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 443. 
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byte multiplexor channel was found by the Transamerica trial 
court to be too slow in accommodating PCM tape drives.s3 Had 
IBM proceeded with the original plans for a faster byte mul-
tiplexor on the 370 processors, PCM drives would have attached. 
IBM argued that engineering problems caused the slowing, but 
the trial court rejected this explanation and found that the de-
gradation of the mUltiplexor was undertaken by IBM solely to 
preclude PCM competition.84 This would have been a Section 2 
violation had IBM possessed monopoly power. 811 However, since 
no finding was made as to IBM's monopoly power, the conduct 
was moot. The trial court also found, however, that Transamer-
ica suffered no damage from this conduct since it did not at-
tempt to develop peripherals to attach to the 155/125s.86 This 
finding in Transamerica is at variance with the CalComp dic-
tum that IBM did not have to orient its product development to 
assist competitors. 
C. Marketing 
Despite the introduction of the 2319A and 2319B, IBM con-
tinued to lose placements to the PCMs, who counterattacked by 
lowering prices on their 2314 copies.87 These price cuts occurred 
sooner and were deeper than anticipated. Users continued to 
have three options in choosing storage capability for their 370 
and 360 systems. They could purchase the IBM subsystem (the 
2314), they could choose the PCM copy at a significantly lower 
price, or they could opt for the 2319 device if native attachment 
was preferred. Many continued to choose the PCM alternative 
and IBM continued to experience significant returns of their 
leased 2314 disk drives.s8 
PCM competition continued to be an ongoing problem for 
IBM management, and new ways were sought to combat it. Af-
ter continued study, including some simulations of the impact 
on selected PCMs, IBM abandoned its long-standing marketing 
policy of leasing equipment for only thirty days and introduced 
83. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1007. 
84. [d. at 1008. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. at 1013. 
87. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 437. 
88. mM's Transamerica Brief, supra note 29, at 1007. 
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a long-term lease arrangement known as the Fixed Term Plan 
(FTP).89 To appreciate the importance of this change in market-
ing strategy, one must understand the importance of leasing in 
the electronic data processing industry. 
IBM pioneered the use of the "risk lease," a thirty-day leas-
ing period which permitted the user of electronic data processing 
equipment to change equipment and suppliers in a short period 
of time.90 This concept was beneficial to the user because it per-
mitted a rapid response to changing data-processing needs and 
allowed users to switch to newer and improved technology as it 
developed. It benefited suppliers like IBM by making it easier 
for users to migrate to new equipment. Once a user had installed 
a given manufacturer's system, the user would be inclined to 
consider replacing that equipment with updated and improved 
versions from the same manufacturer. 
The risk lease also opened the door for the PCMs. After 
copying IBM's most successful products, a PCM could ·confront 
a user with an equivalent product at a lower price. Constrained 
only by a thirty-day' lease, the user could easily switch from IBM 
storage devices to PCM devices and suffer no loss in perform-
ance. The risk lease concept was largely responsible for the sig-
nificant development and growth of PCM competition. 
1. Fixed Term Plan 
IBM was the last holdout in the electronic data processing 
industry for thirty-day leases.91 After a special study by another 
IBM task force of additional strategies for countering continued 
PCM competition, a long-term lease plan was introduced as an 
option for users. The plan, called FTP (fixed term plan), and 
ETP (extended term plan) provided for a considerable reduction 
in lease prices for users who agreed to sign a on~-year or two-
year lease on the equipment. The plan embodied cancellation 
charges equivalent to what the user would have paid for a thirty-
day lease.92 
89. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 437. 
90. For a thorough discussion of the economics of leasing, see FISHER, supra note 13, 
at 191. 
91. IBM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief, supra note 57, at 68. 
92. [d. at 69. 
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FTP and ETP applied to peripheral products subject to the 
strongest competition by PCMs and could be viewed as a price 
cut fostered by lower marketing costs. Users on long-term lease 
plans did not require frequent visits by sales representatives in 
order to prevent the cancellation of thirty-day leases. Other 
firms in the electronic data processing industry employed long-
term lease plans and the PCMs had made them the cornerstone 
of their competitive strategies. Some PCMs even offered leases 
of up to five years with corresponding price reduction. Was 
ffiM's adoption of a common industry marketing activity preda-
tory, as alleged by the PCMs, or was it a reasonable response to 
competition as alleged by IBM? 
This question is answered by reviewing the impact of FTP 
on IBM revenues. In all of the West Coast cases, evidence was 
presented showing that IBM revenues would be reduced for a 
two-year period.9a However, following this reduction, the plan 
was projected to return an increase in revenue and profit 
through expanded demand and increased volume, which would 
overcome the effect of the discount.94 The decrease in revenue 
over the first two years of FTP was cited by plaintiffs as a classic 
"short-run reduction in revenue" designed to drive out competi-
tors, with the implication that prices subsequently would be 
raised to higher levels to increase profit.95 The IBM profit pro-
jections, however, assumed no price change after the initial FTP 
reduction and it was obvious that FTP would produce a higher 
level of profit over the long run than would be the case if IBM 
had maintained the pre-FTP price levels.96 Although the profit-
ability of individual products under FTP varied, the overall 
profitability of the entire FTP program was estimated by IBM 
to be twenty-four percent of revenue.97 In no case did FTP make 
any product unprofitable. 
In all of the West Coast cases FTP was carefully scruti-
nized, and in every case it was judged to be a price cut that was 
substantially profitable for IBM and also a price cut that was 
93. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 438. 
94. mM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief, supra note 57, at 65. 
95. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 32, at 63. 
96. Appellee's Brief, supra note 32, at 37. 
·97. mM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief, supra note 57, at 68. 
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made in response to competition generated by the PCMS.98 Tes-
timony by both plaintiffs' and defendants' witnesses confirmed 
the fact that IBM was rapidly losing business to the PCMs. For 
example, a Memorex witness testified that unless IBM became 
more price competitive, Memorex stood to lose between seventy 
to eighty percent of its disk business.99 
The lower IBM prices under FTP still were higher than 
those of the PCMs. Since predatory pricing means that the 
predator's prices are below its own costs (average variable or av-
erage total)1oo and it was demonstrated that IBM's prices were 
not only profitable but above its costs, the fact that the prices 
after FTP were higher than PCM prices confirms that the price 
cuts were not below PCM's costs. Hence, after FTP, the PCMs 
still had a price advantage, though it was narrower than 
before.101 
D. Summary of the Conduct Issues 
The strategic response by IBM to the competitive pressure 
of PCM products in the time period 1970-73 centered on the 
fact that the critical issue for the user of computer products, in 
making choices among devices to configure or augment an elec-
tronic data processing system, is the ratio of price to perform-
ance.102 Improved performance at the same price, equivalent 
performance at a lower price, or ultimately superior performance 
at a lower price are the central issues in the competitive process. 
This had formed the basis for the growing competitive strength 
of the PCMs in the peripherals area. By copying successful IBM 
machines, the PCMs offered lower prices for equivalent perform-
ance and in some instances improved performance at lowe~ 
prices. To combat the loss of its peripheral business, IBM fol-
lowed the same strategy. It redesigned its products and offered 
them at lower prices. It changed its traditional marketing meth-
ods and offered long-term leases on its products at lower prices. 
Its product designs were shown to have technological justifica-
tion rather than superficial product manipulation. Users were af-
98. CalComp, 613 F.2d at 741-42. 
99. Appellee's Brief, supra note 32, at 27. 
100. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 995-6. 
101. [d. at 1003-04. 
102. Fisher, supra note 138-141. 
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forded additional options. In the case of the 2319A, users were 
not forced to take the native attachment technology. They could 
still use the 2314 disk drive technology. Users of the 360 system 
could substitute 2319B technology if they desired a certain con-
figuration of drives, but retain the 2314s if other configurations 
were desirable. Finally, if the design changes made by IBM did 
not produce better price and/or performance, the user could 
change devices or even complete systems. 
Long-term leases afforded another option. If a user was not 
concerned about new technology superceding old, such user 
could opt for a long-term lease at lower prices. If concern ex-
isted, the thirty-day lease plan could be retained. 
The issues litigated in all of the West Coast cases were es-
sentially those described above. Twelve federal judges (three at 
the trial level and nine at the appeals level) unanimously agreed 
. that IBM's conduct, even assuming it had monopoly power, was 
a manifestation of the competitive' process, finding the end re-
sult an enhancement of user welfare through better products at 
lower prices. 108 
Did IBM's actions increase competitive pressure on the 
PCMs? Unquestionably it did. PCMs were forced to lower the 
prices of their peripherals and to copy the new IBM products 
just as they had copied the old, and their profitability was en-
dangered. Some of the PCMs succumbed to the competitive 
pressures and exited the market. Others regrouped and contin-
ued to compete successfully.104 
The basic premise on which the PCMs entered the per-
ipherals market ultimately proved to be incorrect. IBM did not 
remain passive, protecting the growth of new competition with a 
price umbrella and static technology. Rather it responded with 
price reductions, a new marketing strategy, and improved tech-
nology - all manifestations of a dynamic competitive process. 
103. At the trial level, Judges McNichols (CalComp), Conti (Memorex), and 
Schnacke (Transamerica) issued directed verdicts for IBM. At the appeals level, for each 
of the three cases, a three-judge panel affirmed. 
104. For a discussion of the activities of the PCMs in the 1970s, see McAdams, 
supra, at 294-295. 
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IV. THE WEST COAST CASES AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR 
A review of the West Coast decisions sheds light on the pro-
cess of competition in a market situation where technology is 
advancing rapidly, where entry into the market is relatively 
easy, where buyers have access to multiple options for satisfying 
their needs, and where the leading firm could not maintain its 
industry position without responding to new competition. The 
record in these cases aptly illustrates the action and reaction 
among firms that the competitive process is designed to foster. 1011 
Have the West Coast decisions changed the law on monop-
oly? Or have they clarified and perhaps advanced the existing 
state of monopoly law as it is applied in a rapidly changing mar-
ket where such change is fostered, indeed compelled, by new and 
improved technology? Never before have the courts confronted 
market definition and market conduct issues where rapid tech-
nological change was such a pervasive element in the competi-
tive process. The electronic data processing industry was not 
like those of petroleum, steel, aluminum, shoe machinery, fire 
alarms, or cellophane. This industry, in the space of twenty-five 
years, had undergone significant and rapid technological change, 
resulting in a panoply of products and services and a dramatic 
decline in the cost of information processing. The pace of tech-
nological change obviously had the following competitive effects 
by requiring: (1) firms to seek and adopt new ways of performing 
the computing functions; (2) firms to pursue product excellence 
through improved performance; (3) firms to seek and adopt new 
ways of performing the computing function; (4) continued re-
evaluation of prices, since price/performance was the key to firm 
profitability and survival; and (5) firms to respond to emerging 
competition from a variety of sources - leasing companies, 
time-sharing, service bureaus, mini-computers, microprocessors, 
plug-compatible processors and peripherals, and software 
development. 
Thus it can be seen that electronic data processing was an 
industry in ferment. Change was the norm, not the exception. 
The rapid development of new products and new ways of satis-
105. For insights into this process see Fisher, "Diagnosing Monopoly," 19 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics and Business 7 (1979). 
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fying user needs was a continuous process, forcing firms to 
scramble for market position. The conduct of the leading firm, 
IBM, must be analyzed in this context. IBM had developed the 
disk drive and initially had 100 percent of the market. Unques-
tionably, since disks were a superior storage device, they were a 
highly profitable aspect of IBM's business. New competition in 
the form of PCMs perceived an opportunity to enter the disk 
market and compete with the industry leader by copying its suc-
cessful products and offering them to users as replacements. Be-
cause of lower production costs, the PCMs offered lower prices 
and made significant inroads into IBM's disk market place-
ments. Recognizing the competitive threat, IBM formulated 
strategies to head off this growing competition in order to retain 
its market position. These strategies took the form of price re-
ductions, product design changes, and marketing methods. 
PCMs had entered the disk submarket on the assumption that 
IBM would not respond to their competition in the price area, 
i.e., they assumed that IBM would leave its prices unchanged, 
thus providing a price umbrella under which they could flourish. 
This assumption proved incorrect. Thus the West Coast cases 
developed and provided the courts an opportunity to apply cur-
rent monopoly law to a new environment. The result was a clari-
fication of what a leading firm in a dynamic industry may do in 
response to competitive pressure. 
The well-known dictum from Alcoa, often quoted but rarely 
applied, emerges as a major factor in the new approach to mo-
nopoly stemming from the West Coast cases:' "The successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned 
upon when he wins.lIloe 
Was IBM a successful competitor? What tactics can a firm 
with assumed monopoly power pursue? The fashioning of a legal 
rule to govern a large firm's conduct is difficult and imprecise. 
However, the West Coast cases seemingly have broadened this 
conduct to include a strategic combination of price, product 
modification, and marketing approaches that are made in re-
sponse to competition and are designed to maintain or improve 
the large firm's market position. 
106. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra, at 480. 
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The Transamerica court spoke for all of the Ninth Circuit 
judges when it said: 
It is an unwise policy for the law to coddle com-
petitors, especially if the protection comes at the 
expense of destroying a larger firm's incentive to 
compete. Even companies that choose to enter 
dominated markets must be prepared to face 
competition on the merits. Where a monopolist 
chooses an alternative that does not unreasonably 
restrict competition, the law is not offended. It is 
the choice of an unreasonable alternative not the 
failure to choose the least restrictive alternative, 
that leads to liability.lo7 
Further, it said: 
IBM did not lie dead in the water when faced 
with competition. It took action. And the action it 
took may have caused some competitors to suffer 
more than other actions would have. But the ac-
tion IBM took, under the circumstances in which 
it acted, did not unreasonably restrict competi-
tion, and thus did not violate the law. lOS 
Thus, the West Coast cases helped to clarify and advance 
the state of monopoly law, especially as applied to a rapidly 
changing industry where the industry leader must respond to 
competitive pressures emanating from smaller firms seeking to 
erode that leading position. The cases, building on the Alcoa/ 
United Shoe/Grinnell tests, avoided equating monopoly power 
with market share and focused on market conduct and the re-
sulting market performance. Determining that IBM's conduct 
produced lower prices, superior products that enhanced user 
choice, and alternative terms for acquiring those products, the 
courts in the West Coast cases emphasized that these are the 
results expected from competition, not monopoly. 
The cases established the premise that for conduct to be an-
ticompetitive, it must produce results that are inconsistent with 
competition - higher prices and inferior products plus failure to 
adjust to user demands. None of these were present in the West 
107. Transamerica, supra, at 1022. 
108.Id. 
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Coast cases. The fact that individual competitors suffered dis-
comfort in the form of lower profits or perhaps eventual exit 
from the market does not suggest the use of monopoly power. In 
CalComp, Memorex, and Transamerica the issue was competi-
tion, not competitors, and the outcomes were consistent with 
traditional economic analysis. 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/4
